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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Is it Time to Revisit Qualified Immunity?

The right to sue and defend in the courts of the several states
are essential privileges of citizenship.1 The Supreme Court
has explained these rights as essential to a civilized society:
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The right to sue and defend in the courts is the
alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation
of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most
essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by
each state to the citizens of all other states to the precise
extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. Equality of
treatment in this respect is not left to depend upon comity
between the states, but is granted and protected by the
Federal Constitution.2
Eight generations ago, this right was unavailable to
black people, even freed slaves. Why? Because, in 1789,
descendants of African slaves were never intended to
be citizens.3 Thus, even federal courts lacked Article III
jurisdiction over claims brought by freed slaves.4
After a failed attempt at self-determination in the 1860’s, the
former Confederate states were required to abandon slavery
and to recognize the equal citizenship and rights of black
Americans.5 And new citizens did pursue their claims in
court, with early litigation addressing testamentary bequests
that former slaves enforced as new citizens. In 1869, the
Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged this and held, “While
a freedman may, in the Courts of this State, enforce any legal
equity which was created in his favor, while a slave, that did
not then contravene the policy of the law [i.e., receiving a
bequest], he cannot maintain an action for injuries which he
may have received, or for wages on account of labor done by
him, while he was a slave.”6
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Clearly, these newfound rights were tenuous in the several
states. Then, and for years to come, local governments
failed to protect African Americans from violence and
discrimination and were sometimes complicit in those
violations. During congressional debates in 1871 about
how to strengthen the rights of former slaves, Kansas
Representative David Perley Lowe stated:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while
whippings and lynchings and banishment have been
visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local
administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling
to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than
the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the
worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of
justice. Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the
public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of
effective redress.7
To aid in the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal rights and due process, Congress passed
the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, also known as the
Civil Rights Act of 1871.8 The law is codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and provides (as enacted):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.9
The statute contained no affirmative defenses. Thus,
Congress created a federal cause of action to pursue damages
from state actors who violate individuals’ constitutional
rights. For years, Section 1983 had little use, as the Supreme
Court narrowly interpreted the state action requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883.10
Corollary legislation included Rev. Stat. § 1980, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1985, provides a narrow cause of action to
redress conspiracies to violate civil rights.
In 1915, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of election
officials who were ordered to pay damages to three black
men, for violating their Fifteenth Amendment right to vote
in an election under a “grandfather provision” in state voting
laws.11 The defendants argued that they were just following
state law, and that they could not be liable because they did
not act with malice.12 The Court found these arguments to be
without merit and sustained the damages award.13
Monroe v. Pape is a seminal case on Section 1983, in which
the Supreme Court held that state actors who abuse their
state-law authority, can be held liable for violating the federal
civil rights of their victims.14 There, police officers conducted

30

a warrantless home invasion, ransacked the plaintiffs’ home,
arrested the man of the house without a warrant, denied him
the right to a phone call, interrogated him, and then released
him. The Supreme Court definitively held that liability
under Section 1983 can arise not only when state actors are
enforcing an illegal state law, but also when they misuse their
state-law authority.15 Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken “under
color of” state law.16
It took six years for the Court to begin its process of cabining
in the Monroe decision. In Pierson v. Ray, Mississippi police
officers arrested civil rights protesters under an anti-loitering
law that was later found to be unconstitutional.17 The officers
claimed that they were not enforcing segregation by arresting
the individuals, but rather attempting to prevent violence.
The Court decided that Section 1983 must be viewed against
the background of general tort principles, and that a false
imprisonment action at common law could be defeated by
good faith and probable cause.18
Qualified immunity, as we know it today, was born in 1982
when the Supreme Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald.19
There, the Court overruled prior precedent that “good
faith” was a defense to civil rights violations because “bare
allegations of malice should not subject government officials
either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad reaching
discovery.”20 Thus, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.”21
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than
a mere defense to liability … it is effectively lost if a case
is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”22 Courts evaluating
pleas of qualified immunity by state actors by deciding if
the plaintiff’s complaint states a violation of a constitutional
right, and if so, whether the right was “clearly established.”23
It has been said that, “the contours of a right are sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right.”24 Under this
standard, state actors are only charged with knowledge of
“cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the
time of the incident” and “a consensus of cases of persuasive
authority such that a reasonable officer could not have
believed that his actions were lawful.”25
Under courts’ reductionist interpretation of what rights are
“clearly established,” actions that most would say violates
an individual’s constitutional rights are routinely held not
to because no prior precedent involved the exact facts.
For example, the growth of qualified immunity and the
militarization of local law enforcement agencies26 have
arguably shielded the following police action
from accountability:
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a)	Officers executed a search warrant and reported
seizing $50,000 in cash, when they were alleged to
have taken over $150,000 in cash and $125,000 in rare
coins. They were granted qualified immunity because
no case on point fairly warned them that theft was
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.27
b)	A homeowner gave police permission to enter her
home to look for her ex-boyfriend, though she told the
officers she did not believe the ex-boyfriend was at her
home, but she had no problem with them checking.
The officers spent half a day destroying her home with
shotgun-fired tear gas grenades. Because no clearly
established authority prohibited their conduct, officers
were not liable to their now-homeless victim.28
c)	A juvenile pretrial inmate, out for a shower, unlocked
cells to allow two other inmates to attack a fourth
inmate. The guards were watching TV when it
happened, and no clearly established case otherwise
directed them to prevent the attack.29
d)	An officer was granted qualified immunity when he
shot and killed an armed occupant of a house, because
it was reasonable under clearly established law for the
officer to assume that other officers had announced
police presence.30
e)	A driver involved in a high-speed chase surrendered
and laid down next to his car. The arresting officer
handcuffed the suspect before holstering his gun and
shot the suspect in the shoulder. Because the officer
testified that it was an accident, he was awarded
qualified immunity.31
f)	A federal court determined that a dean’s
recommendation of nonrenewal of an Asian faculty
member was infected by discrimination. The provost
embraced the recommendation of nonrenewal, even
though he acknowledged that the professor had
demonstrated the presence of discrimination and a
high turnover rate among minority faculty. Because
the faculty member’s dispute could be viewed as
a “personal grievance,” the Tenth Circuit awarded
the provost qualified immunity in response to the
professor’s First Amendment claim.32

Moreover, there is serious doubt that one of the primary
justifications offered for qualified immunity – that it derives
from a common law “good faith” defense – withstands
scrutiny. As noted, the Court’s decision in Pierson v. Ray
analogized to common law suits for false arrest, in which
an officer would not be liable for a false arrest if he acted
in good faith and with probable cause, even if the victim’s
innocence were later proved.33 As an initial matter, it
is questionable that such a good faith defense was well
established in suits about constitutional violations at the
time Section 1983 was enacted. To the extent such a defense
existed, it was much narrower than a general immunity to
suit.34 Regardless, following Pierson, the Court quickly
began to expand its new immunity doctrine well beyond the
scope of any common law defense,35 and morphed the good
faith defense into an objective analysis of the reasonableness
of the official’s conduct,36 which was unknown to the
common law.
Another common justification the Court gives for qualified
immunity is lenity for officials who, it believes, cannot
be expected to anticipate constitutional rulings that even
federal courts may not.37 The doctrine of leniency derives
from criminal law and is an odd fit in the context of civil
liability under Section 1983. Ironically, however, the Court’s
decisions rarely if ever extend the same leniency to actual
criminal defendants.38
The tide may be changing. Many district Courts are speaking
up on this issue. In White v. City of Topeka, for example,
Judge Crabtree collected authorities for the proposition
that qualified immunity is in serious need of an overhaul,
while nevertheless applying the doctrine to shield an officer
from liability for killing a suspect.39 With an outflow of
questionable court decisions shielding officers solely because
they act under color of state law, it is time for the Supreme
Court to reconsider the path that qualified immunity has
created. Only then, can the original purposes of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 be arguably vindicated.

What is the right to sue for redress of grievances if violations
of the law are only redressable if the law was “clearly
established”? Many now protest that people are dying on the
streets due to misconduct by law enforcement. Looking back,
the notion of limiting Section 1983 to violations of “clearly
established law,” and disregarding the motive or intent of
the alleged violator, would have been unheard of in the 19th
century. Holding state actors liable for violating people’s
constitutional rights is the point of § 1983 and its purpose
appears to be eroding away.
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